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COMMENTS
responsibility of providing a financially solvent enterprise which
could satisfy a judgment secured by a plaintiff injured through
breach of the above standards. However, because of the increas-'
ing difficulty of the duties of the police force, it is felt that
there should be a differentiation between negligent breaches and
intentional breaches. In the former situation, the officer should,
be disciplined by way of administrative procedure while the
municipality should bear the brunt of a civil judgment for the
torts of its employee. However, in the latter situation, the mental
element makes it desirable that the officer and the municipality
be liable in solido. It is noted that such a scheme presupposes
that the veil of municipal immunity would be lifted as previously
discussed. It is submitted that the adoption of the above proposals
would give our courts the gauge by which to adequately judge
and redress violations of the legal rights of criminal suspects
and would in the end accomplish the purpose of upgrading our
police force.
The problem of inappropriate use of deadly force by a police
.officer is as old and as complicated as the problem of crime
itself. To criminally convict or to civilly condemn the individual
policeman is to treat the symptom while encouraging the disease
to fester. The causes of the problem are an inadequately trained
police force and law in the state of generality to the point of
uselessness. It is only when these causes are eliminated that
the problem will be resolved.
Van R. Mayhall, Jr.
CIVIL COMMITMENT PROCEDURE IN LOUISIANA
As of 1966, the United States had between 600,000 and
650,000 persons hospitalized because of mental illness.' Today
more people are involuntarily hospitalized in mental institutions
than are imprisoned for the commission of crime.2 Volumi-
nous research and writing in both the medical and the legal
fields have been concerned with the problems of America's
mentally disturbed. The dilemma of the mentally ill is com-
1. Couch, Book Review, 44 TUL. L REV. 426, 431 (1970). In 1962-63, the
average daily population in Louisiana mental hospitals was 7,188 patients.
Another 10,069 persons were cared for in community clinics. LOUISIANA'S
NEW PLAN-MENTAL HEALTH SERVICES 11 (La. State Dep't of Hospitals 1964).
2. Note, 35 BROOKLYN L. REv. 187, 188 (1969).
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plicated by the necessity for legal protection which must be
provided for every person suspected of being, and found to be,
mentally disturbed, "because he is a citizen first and a mental
patient second."'3 The purpose of this Comment is to review
the Louisiana procedures which may be used to commit persons
to mental hospitals against their will,4 and evaluate them in
the light of current federal constitutional standards and require-
ments and contemporary theories of mental hospitalization.
Specifically, the paper is limited to the procedural problems
of notice and the opportunity to be heard, the hearing, and the
problem of the right to counsel.
Commitment similar to that which exists today was unknown
in America before the late eighteenth century, and not until
the nineteenth century did concern develop that commitment
to mental institutions might be, and was being, used to deprive
persons of their liberty illegally. Much effort was made to make
mental commitment difficult to achieve, resulting in procedures
which possibly did more to retard the progress of mental health
than to protect those mentally healthy.5 Psychiatrists protested
excessive "legalisms,"6 a reaction began, and the trend turned
to increasingly liberalized procedures.7 It is possible that reaction
has become over-reaction,8 however, and that we have deferred
to medical opinion to too great an extent, perhaps forgetting that
the original fears were not totally unfounded. It may be true
that "railroading" is in large part mythical;9 but the law must
3. SPECIAL COMMITTEE OF THE ASSOCIATION OF THE BAR OF THE CITY or NEw
YORK, MENTAL ILLNESS AND DUE PROCESS 14 (1962).
4. Excluded from the purview of this paper are procedures for mental
commitment which in any way arise from criminal proceedings. Such pro-
cedures constitute a separate area with unique problems.
5. For the early history of mental commitment in America, see A.
DEUTSCH, THE MENTALLY ILL IN AMERICA 418-28 (2d ed. 1949).
6. Psychiatrists have often criticized what they consider excessive for-
mality in hospitalization proceedings. In 1946, Dr. Karl Bowman, then
president of the American Psychiatric Association, said: "[Tihe public is
so obsessed with the legal point of view and the alleged infallibility of legal
procedure that they insist on protecting the so-called legal rights of the
patient without thinking what his medical rights are." 103 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY
1, 12 (1946), quoted in M. GUTTMACHER & H. WEIHOFEN, PSYCHIATRY AND THE
LAW 289 (1952).
7. THE REPORT OF THE AMERICAN BAR FOUNDATION ON THE RIGHTS OF THE
MENTALLY ILL, THE MENTALLY DISABLED AND THE LAw 16 (F. Lindman & D.
McIntyre ed. 1961) (hereinafter cited as LINDMAN & MCINTYRE); Comment,
1969 DUKE L.J. 677.
8. See Comment, 61 Nw. U.L. Rsv. 977, 983 (1966), in which a student
writer expresses a similar opinion.
9. A. DEUTSCH, THE MENTALLY ILL IN AMERICA 418 (2d ed. 1949); Curran,
Hospitalization of the Mentally I1, 31 N.C.L. REv. 274, 292-93 (1953).
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guard against any possibility of liberty attaining the status of
myth. American values concerning liberty and due process of
law require fundamental standards of fairness in attempts to
confine persons against their will because of alleged criminality.
Such values, it would seem, require fairness in attempts to
do the same thing-deprive one of his liberty-in the involuntary
commitment of the mentally ill. As the immediate aim-confine-
ment-is the same in criminal and civil proceedings, some of
the same constitutional requirements may be found necessary
in both proceedings. Because of the paucity of case law on
the subject, however, it is not yet known precisely which con-
stitutional requirements finally will be applied. If it may be
assumed that most people sought to be committed are indeed
mentally ill, psychological considerations will necessitate deft
balancing, careful study, and selective application of constitu-
tional standards by the courts. It is submitted that certain fun-
damental requirements of due process must be applicable to
hospitalization proceedings, but that the entire panoply of due
process requirements of the criminal process should not be, at
least not in the same manner. 10 The reasons for this position
will be more adequately set forth in the discussion of each
particular problem.
The state's authority to detain and confine the mentally
ill is said to have been based originally on society's right to
protect itself against dangerous persons, that is, the police
power," "one of the most essential of powers, at times the most
insistent, and always one of the least limitable of the powers
of government.' 2 Today, the doctrine of parens patriae, which
holds that the state as servant of the common good may care
for those unable to care for themselves, is also asserted to justify
the confinement of the mentally disturbed.'8 The Matter of
Josiah Oakes14 was the first explicit judicial recognition in the
United States of the principle that the state can confine the
10. Cafeteria Workers v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 895 (1961): "[C]onstd-
eration of what procedures due process may require under any given set of
circumstances must begin with a determination of the precise nature of the
government function involved as well as of the private Interest that has
been affected by governmental action."
11. LINDMAN & MCINTYRE 17 (1961); see also Ross, Commitment of the
Mentally Ill: Problems of Law and Policy, 57 MIcH. L. Ruv. 945-55 (1959).
12. District of Columbia v. Brooke, 214 U.S. 138, 149 (1909).
13. Ross, Commitment of the Mentally Ill: Problens of Law and Policy,
57 MIcH. L. Rzv. 945 (1959).
14. 8 Law Rep. 123 (1845-46). See Confinement of the Insane, 3 Am. L.
Ruv. 193, 199 (1869).
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mentally ill on the basis of the need for remedial or therapeutic
treatment. 1 5 Confusion exists in the literature and the jurispru-
dence as to the precise delineation of these concepts.'" The
United States Supreme Court has branded the doctrine of
parens patriae a "murky" concept whose "historic credentials
are of dubious relevance."'1 7 It would seem that for purposes
of determining proper procedure in the commitment process
recourse should not be made to these nebulous concepts. Where
any distinction must be made in deciding when otherwise man-
datory procedures in the commitment process may be dispensed
with, it should be simply on the basis of the potential danger
imposed by the individual to himself and/or society.18 If the
would-be patient is seriously thought to be dangerous, whether
to himself or others, then, and only then, should the more
stringent procedural devices not be used prior to commitment;
and, as will be illustrated later, when this is done, effective
substitutes should be required. At present Louisiana does not
make such a distinction; its procedural safeguards are lacking
in other respects as well.
Louisiana Commitment Procedures
Louisiana provides four methods for the purely civil com-
mitment of the mentally ill: 19 voluntary admission, coroner's
commitment, judicial commitment, and emergency commit-
ment.2e The voluntary admission procedure, encouraged by
authorities 2' in the psychiatric field,2 allows any mentally ill,
inebriate, or epileptic person desiring treatment to apply to the
superintendent of the state hospital or to the director of a private
hospital for admission. 28 Before he is admitted, the patient must
15. A. DEUTSCH, THE MENTALLY ILL IN AMERICA 423 (2d ed. 1949).
16. Cf., e.g., E. FREUND, THE POLICE POWER § 155 (1904); Comment, 34
U. CHI. L. REV. 633, 653 n.98 (1967); State v. Green, 360 Mo. 1249, 232 S.W.2d
897 (1950).
17. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 16 (1967).
18. Cf. State v. Mullinax, 364 Mo. 858, 269 S.W.2d 72 (1954).
19. The Louisiana Mental Health Law is found in Title 28 of the Re-
vised Statutes, and is briefly outlined in Slovenko & Super, Commitment
Procedure in Louisiana, 35 TuL L. REV. 705 (1961).
20. LA. R.S. 28:50 (Supp. 1968).
21. IANDMAN & MCINTYRE 107 (1961).
22. Persons who enter the hospital voluntarily are usually better patients
and have greater chance of early recovery. The voluntary admission helps
to eliminate the detention spirit, and has become closely tied to modern
therapy. SPECIAL COMMITTEE OF THE ASsOCIATION OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF
Nsw YORK, MENTAL ILLNESS AND DUE PROCESS 13, 16 (1962). See also Curran,
Hospitalization of the Mentally Il, 31 N.C.L. REV. 274, 277 (1953).
23. LA. R.S. 28:51 (Supp. 1966).
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be fully informed of the provisions of the Mental Health Law. 4
A patient voluntarily admitted is entitled to his release upon
demand; 25 however, provision is made for postponement of
his discharge if the superintendent of the hospital, within forty-
eight hours of the request for discharge, files a certificate with
the local district court stating release would be unsafe for the
patient or others. Judicial commitment proceedings must then
be instituted.26
The coroner's commitment is initiated upon the application
of any responsible person, in the absence of relatives, giving
the reason why institutional care is needed.2 The application
must be accompanied by a certificate of the coroner and one
other qualified physician stating that the patient has been
examined within three days of the application and is in need
of care or observation. The application must then be submitted
for approval to the district judge of the district from which
the patient is to be committed. After fourteen days, the cer-
tificate of the coroner and the physician is invalid and the
superintendent may not receive the patient for confinement.2
The coroner is authorized to detain the patient by confining
him in any state hospital or parish jail or private mental hospital
for not more than thirty days or until committed or ordered
released. 29
Judicial commitment may be upon the application of any
responsible person, accompanied by a certificate of examination
of the coroner and another qualified physician.8 0 The judge
may commit when he thinks it "in the best interest of the
patient and the community." 1 A hearing is to be held not less
than five days from receipt of the examiner's report. The patient's
presence at this hearing is within the court's discretion, and he
may even be committed to an institution for a limited period of
observation. Provision is also made for the appointment of a
24. Id.




29. Id. 28:52.1 (Supp. 1966).
30. Id. 28:53(a) (Supp. 1962). The statute says "accompanied by a cer-
tificate as provided in R.S. 28:52,' which is the provision for the coroner's
commitment. Why the coroner should be involved in this process Is not clear.
31. Id. 28:53(b).
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commission to aid the court in its decision, but this too is
within the court's discretion.8 2
Any relative, friend, or curator may apply to the superin-
tendent of a mental hospital for the emergency commitment of
one who needs immediate mental care.88 The application is to
be accompanied by the certificate of a qualified physician; the
accompanying certificate is valid for only twenty-four hours.
Although the state sets thirty days as the ordinary maximum
for confinement under this procedure, it allows the continued
detention of the patient upon the authorization of the judge
or coroner.8 4 If the superintendent of the hospital thinks com-
mitment is necessary, he must institute proceedings for coroner's
or judicial commitment, and may retain the patient, on the
authorization of the judge or coroner, until judicial or coroner's
commitment proceedings are accomplished. 85 Another statute,8 6
not contained in the title on mental health, allows the coroner
to order the apprehension and detention, "for a reasonable length
of time," "in a mental hospital or jail," of any person for whose
detention application has been made on the ground that he is
"mentally ill, mentally defective, inebriate, addict, epileptic, or
psychopathic and is in need of observation or care." Such action,
32. Id. 28:54 (1950).
33. Id. 28:57.
34. While the Louisiana Constitution requires that the coroner's office
ordinarily be filled by a licensed physician, a layman may serve as coroner
where no physician is available or none will accept the post. LA. CONST. art.
VII, § 71. Moreover, the coroner may delegate his duties to a justice of the
peace if he chooses to do so. LA. R.S. 33:1553 (1950). Thus, it is conceivable
that detention may be ordered by one not trained either in law or medicine,
much less in the specialized field of psychiatry. Id. 28:52, as amended La.
Acts 1952, No. 152, § 1 and La. Acts 1954, No. 701, § 1: "Any detentions, con-
finements or commitments made by the coroner under the above recited
circumstances are hereby declared to be administrative acts attached to the
functions of his office as required by law and for which acts he is specifically
granted personal immunity, but not relieved of his official responsibility in
his capacity as coroner." A similar grant of immunity is contained in LA.
R.S. 33:1555 (1950). Where the coroner acts contrary to statutory procedure,
however, he will not be granted immunity from an action for damages under
the Civil Rights Act of 1871 (42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1871)), despite the Louisiana
statutes. Delatte v. Genovese, 273 F. Supp. 654 (E.D. La. 1967).
35. LA. R.S. 28:57 (1950).
36. Id. 33:1555. This statute was last amended by La. Acts 1952, No. 151.
Id. 28:52, dealing with the coroner's commitment, was amended by La. Acts
1952, No. 152. Both were approved by the governor on the same day. In addi-
tion, id. 28:52 was amended by La. Acts 1954, No. 701, to read as it presently
does. La. Acts 1954, No. 701, contains a general repealing clause in § 2.
Therefore, it may be that id. 33:1555 has been repealed to the extent that
it conflicts with id. 28:52. Nevertheless, enough confusion and repetition re-
main in other provisions of the Mental Health Law to warrant new and
clarified statutes.
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the statute declares, is "for the accused person's own good and
for the peace and safety of the community."
These statutory procedures for commitment are ambiguous,
redundant, and conflicting; more importantly, they contain the
potential for great abuse. Not only may a person be deprived
of his liberty for up to thirty days without judicial review,
but he may be put in jail by the coroner on the application of
any "responsible" person. An irate wife, for example, might
succeed in having her husband incarcerated over the week-end.
And, more disturbingly, the procedures now available present
the haunting possibility that political beliefs and activities which
deviate from the accepted norm easily may be punished by a
sojourn in a penal institution.
Notice and the Opportunity to Be Heard
The Louisiana Mental Health Law has no provisions requir-
ing pre-commitment notice to the allegedly mentally ill person,
nor is there any provision for a mandatory pre-commitment
hearing. Many medical authorities would applaud these omis-
sions; many lawyers, on the other hand, would denounce them.
Pragmatically, notice gives the allegedly mentally ill person an
opportunity to contest the attempt to hospitalize him, to prepare
a defense to any "accusation" of mental instability. Psychiatrists
are prone to think that notice will only have an adverse effect
on the one to be committed, causing him trauma and further
mental injury, and will be futile in any event, as an insane
person will not be able to take advantage of notice served on
him. This position assumes that all those sought to be com-
mitted are indeed mentally ill; but "insanity is the very thing
to be tried. '37 Contrarily, of course, if notice is served on all
sought to be be committed, it will be served on some who are
indeed mentally ill, perhaps seriously so, and who might be
traumatized by it or unable to understand its import. The prob-
lem is one which calls for a careful weighing of medical and
legal considerations. Medical opinion notwithstanding, the
absence of any pre-commitment notice or hearing requirements
raises serious constitutional questions.
Although the United States Supreme Court has charac-
terized the "primary sense" of due process as "an opportunity
37. In re Welman, 3 Kan. App. 100, 104, 45 P. 726, 727 (1896).
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to be heard and to defend a substantive right,"8 it has never
decided the specific question of whether pre-commitment notice
and hearing is required by the fourteenth amendment. In
Simon v. Craft,9 the court held that due process requires notice
and hearing on the issue of the commitment of one allegedly
mentally ill, but it did not decide whether the hearing must
precede the confinement of the person. One Louisiana case has
dealt with the question. In In re Bryant,40 the petitioner claimed
that his commitment without prior opportunity to be heard was
a denial of his rights and a deprivation of his liberty without
due process of law. The Louisiana Supreme Court rejected the
claim, saying that "[w]ere it not for two concurring and im-
portant factors such contention might have considerable merit. '41
The factors which impressed the court were (1) that commit-
ment is "merely a matter of police regulation, purposing to
protect both the patient and the general public,"42 and (2)
the petitioner had an opportunity for a post-commitment hear-
ing. The court did not cite any authority for its decision. It
is possible that the court analogized the second reason to those
cases which have held that a hearing after state action affecting
property rights satisfies the due process clause. 43
Other courts have drawn this analogy to sustain commit-
ment without prior notice and hearing.44 Such juridical rea-
soning has been criticized sharply 5 on the ground that a taking
38. Brinkerhoff-Faris Co. v. Hill, 281 U.S. 673, 678 (1930).
39. 182 U.S. 427 (1901).
40. 214 La. 573, 38 So.2d 245 (1949).
41. Id at 584, 38 So.2d at 249.
42. Id.
43. See, e.g., Opp Cotton Mills v. Administrator, 312 U.S. 126 (1941);
United States v. Illinois Cent. R.R., 291 U.S. 457 (1934); Phillips v. Commis-
sioner, 283 U.S. 589 (1931).
44. See, e.g., In re Ryan, 47 F. Supp. 10 (E.D. Pa. 1942); Hammon v. Hill,
228 F. 999 (W.D. Pa. 1915); Payne v Arkebauer, 190 Ark. 614, 80 S.W.2d 76
(1935); County of Black Hawk v. Springer, 58 Iowa 417, 10 N.W. 791 (1882);
In re Dowdell, 169 Mass. 387, 47 N.E. 1033 (1897); Ex parte Dagley, 35 Okla.
180, 128 P. 699 (1912). But see Barry v. Hall, 98 F.2d 222 (D.C. Cir. 1938), in
which the court, in interpreting a federal statute, rejected the appellee's
reliance on cases in which after-the-fact hearings in commitment proceed-
ings were held sufficient for due process purposes. "The provisions for ulti-
mate hearing were held to save the statutes. We think the cases were
wrongly decided." Id. at 228.
45. See Note, 75 HARv. L. REv. 847 (1962); Comment, 61 Nw. U.L. Rsv.
977, 981 (1967). "Law such as this is an affront to the very concept of due
process. Any man has the right not to be unjustly confined for an inde-
terminate period of time pending his eventual release through an operation
of an appeal procedure." Kutner, The Illusion of Due Process in Commit-
ment Proceedings, 57 Nw. U.L. REV. 383, 397 (1962); Petition of Rohrer, 353
Mass. 282, 230 N.E.2d 915 -(1967).
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of liberty and a taking of property are not comparable-for one
whose property is taken is still free to contest the action, while
one who is confined against his will may not have any op-,
portunity to initiate legal proceedings to regain his freedom.
United States Supreme Court decisions sanctioning post-seizure
hearings have been carefully limited. Justice Brandeis, speaking
for the Court in Phillips v. Commissioner,4 6 for example, said:
"Where only property rights are involved, mere postpone-
ment of the judicial inquiry is not a denial of due process,
if the opportunity given for the ultimate judicial deter-
mination of the liability is adequate."47 (Emphasis added.)
Even in cases involving property rights, the Supreme Court
has sought to balance public and private interests, allowing
dispensation with prior hearings "only where summary action
is required by the peculiarly urgent nature of the governmental
interest. ' '48 In the recent case of Goldberg v. Kelly,49 the Court
held that procedural due process under the fourteenth amend-
ment requires that welfare recipients be afforded an evidentiary
hearing before termination of state benefits by welfare authori-
ties. The Court concluded that the recipient's interest in unin-
terrupted receipts of public assistance, together with the state's
interest that payments not be terminated erroneously, out-
weighed the state's countervailing interest in conserving admin-
istrative and fiscal resources. This balancing approach is also
used in conscription cases, where the private interest is not in
property but in liberty. Justice Harlan, concurring in Oestereich
v. Selective Service Board, explained that the reason for post-
poning judicial review of induction orders is twofold: (1) to
stay induction pending such review would work havoc with
orderly processing into the armed forces (i.e., the national
interest here outweighs the private interest), and (2) the induc-
tee has had some opportunity for review within the Selective
Service System."' In exercising their inherent power to punish
46. 283 U.S. 589 (1931).
47. Id. at 596-97. See also Ewing v. Mytinger & Casselberry, 339 U.S.
594 (1950); of. Bowles v. Willingham, 321 U.S. 503 (1944).
48. See Note, 76 YALn L.J. 1234, 1239 (1967), and cases cited therein.
49. 25 L.Ed.2d 287, 89 S.Ct. 287 (1970).
50. 393 U.S. 233 (1968).
51. Id. at 240-41. Justice Harlan felt that "[ilt is doubtful whether a
person may be deprived of his personal liberty without the prior oppor-
tunity to be heard by some tribunal competent fully to adjudicate his
claims." Id. at 243, n.6. Justice Stewart, however, expressed disagreement
with this statement. Id. at 250, n.10.
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contemptuous conduct committed in their presence, a power
"arbitrary in its nature and liable to abuse, '52 courts deprive
persons of liberty without prior notice and hearing. But the
power is thought essential to preserve the authority of the courts
and prevent the administration of justice from falling into
disrepute. 5 Here again, the public interest outweighs the
individual interest. It is submitted, however, that in the area
of mental hospitalization, where the person whose commitment
is sought is not dangerous, the public interest in providing
care does not outweigh the individual's interest in preserving
his liberty from summary deprivation instituted by either pri-
vate citizens or the state. It is believed that the United States
Supreme Court, following its approach in other areas, would not
allow the hospitalization of one who presents no danger unless
he has been notified of the attempt and given a hearing on the
issue.54
Emergency commitments of the dangerous without notice
and hearing are justifiable and necessary. Society has a right
to protect itself-and the patient-from harm.55 Moreover, with-
52. Ex parts Terry, 128 U.S. 289, 313 (1888).
53. See Fisher v. Pace, 336 U.S. 155 (1949). In Illinois v. Allen, 25 L.Ed.2d
353, 359, 90 S.Ct. 1057, 1061 (1970), the Court said: "It is essential to the
proper administration of criminal justice that dignity, order, and decorum
be the hallmarks of all court proceedings in our country."
54. But see Baxstrom v. Herold, 383 U.S. 107, 111 (1966), where the fol-
lowing statement is found: "Classification of mentally ill persons as either
insane or dangerously insane of course may be a reasonable distinction for
purposes of determining the type of custodial or medical care to be given,
but it has no relevance whatever in the context of the opportunity to show
whether a person is mentally ill at all." In Baxstrom the Court held that
the petitioner was denied equal protection by the laws of the New York
statutory procedure whereby a person may be civilly committed at the end
of a penal sentence without the jury review available to all others civilly
committed. He was further denied equal protection by his commitment to an
institution maintained by the department of corrections beyond the expira-
tion of his prison term without the judicial determination of his being dan-
gerously mentally ill afforded to all being so committed except those nearing
the end of a penal sentence.
Because Baxstrom concerned one already incarcerated for a criminal
offense, it may be that the Court will limit the application of the Baxstrom
rule to situations Involving the criminally insane. Nevertheless, the broad
statement quoted above may be cited in the future as authority for the
holding that no distinction is to be made between those dangerously men-
tally ill and those who present no obvious danger to themselves or others.
It is hoped that this unfortunate result will not be reached, for it could
deprive many persons of their continued freedom while doing nothing to
serve the interests of mental health.
55. "[L]iberty may not be carried to the point where it threatens the
correlative liberty of others, and so there can be no question of the pro-
priety of committing a person without his consent if he is dangerous to
others. And since the life and health of an individual is a matter of social
concern as well as of private concern to himself, society has a legitimate
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out an emergency commitment procedure, dangerously ill per-
sons will very likely be put in jail until a hearing is held,
perhaps for allegedly disturbing the peace. The amount of proof
needed to warrant an emergency commitment should be exact-
ing, perhaps a stringent certification by three physicians that
the person is indeed dangerous. The problem is, of course, com-
plicated by other factors, such as the possible unavailability
of so many physicians, especially in rural areas. Precisely what
prerequisites will be required before an emergency commit-
ment will be allowed is but one of the difficulties to be faced.
When considering medical arguments for liberal procedures,
recognition must be given to the importance of notice and hear-
ing to our concept of justice. These procedures serve as safe-
guards against having "rights decided in a secret star chamber
proceeding and . . . life or liberty taken by a lettre de cachet
calling for confinement or liquidation""" without any chance
of defense. The fact that a hearing after commitment may be
demanded 7 or that the ancient writ of habeas corpus 8 is avail-
able does not help prevent the initial deprivation of liberty.
Besides, the ignorant may not know of these rights, and the
poor often will be unable to use them in a practical way.59
Interest in protecting a person even against himself. For the same reason
that it is proper for the state to prohibit suicide or self-mutilation, it may
properly commit involuntarily a person who is seriously harming himself."
M. GUTTMACHER & H. WEIHOFEN, PSYCHIATRY AND THE LAW 311-12 (1952). It
Is assumed for the purposes of this Comment that the present bases for
commitment are constitutional. For one view that some present laws trans-
gress constitutional limitations, see Whitmore, Comments on a Draft Actfor the Hospitalization of the Mentally Ill, 19 GEo. WAsH. L. REv. 512 (1951).
A good discussion is also found in Comment, 53 VA. L. REv. 1134 (1967).
In Fhagen v. Miller, 306 F. Supp. 634, 638 (S.D.N.Y. 1969), the court said,
In dictum: "Undoubtedly a forthwith commitment and temporary detention
of allegedly mentally ill persons for observation without prior notice and
hearing, where 'immediate action is necessary for the protection of society
and for the welfare of the allegedly mentally ill,' is constitutionally per-
missible, providing an adequate means is available to test the cause and
reasonableness of the detention."
56. M. GUTTMACHER & H. WEIHOFEN, PSYCHIATRY AND THE LAW 289 (1952).
57. LA. R.S. 28:56 (1950).
58. Id. 28:171(6). As one judge has remarked, "not only is 'the pre-
sumption that the confined person knows the law . . . highly unrealistic,'
but if the statute is constitutionally defective, it will not be saved by the
Great Writ. Nor is it saved by an express recognition in the state's Mental
Hygiene Law of a patient's right to the writ. The statute adds nothing to
his constitutional right to avail himself of it." Fhagen v. Miller, 306 F. Supp.
634, 638 (S.D.N.Y. 1969).
59. Cohen, The Function of the Attorney and the Commitment of the
Mentally fli, 44 TEXAS L. Rzv. 424, 453 (1969). It is interesting to recall that
commitment laws when first enacted in the eighteenth century were con-
sidered but another method of dealing with pauperism and vagrancy. M.
GUTTMACHER & H. WEIHOFEN, PSYCHIATRY AND THE LAW 292 (1952). Is it possi-
ble that such is still partially true today?
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One might wonder whether the educated middle-class or affluent
person, of good mental health, will consider recourse to these
devices once he has been shocked and demoralized by finding
himself in a mental institution. Reliance on post-commitment
proceedings which must be initiated by the patient is unsatis-
factory. If, as is suggested, prior notice and hearing are required
in non-emergency cases, real and adequate substitutes o for them
must be had in emergency cases. Notice to an attorney"' and
relatives, followed by a prompt hearing (giving counsel suffi-
cient time to prepare his case)0 2 might constitute such.
The Hearing
Louisiana makes no provision for a jury determination of
the need for commitment. Although hospitalization results in a
loss of liberty as does a criminal conviction, it is believed
that the analogy to the criminal process is not to be extended
to require jury trials in hospitalization proceedings. Almost
all authorities are opposed to jury trials in this area.u A jury
trial is said to carry the taint of criminality and to stigmatize
the allegedly mentally ill person. 4 In Illinois, which made
jury trials available, more commitments of the sane took place
than had ever occurred because of the old procedure. 5 On the
other hand juries may be misled by patients who are indeed
sick and in need of care but who momentarily seem perfectly
normal. The result may be that one who, in the opinion of
almost all medical authorities, requires care, will be adjudged
sane by a well-meaning but misled group of laymen. 6 In
short, juries are not particularly suited for such determinations.
60. See Kutner, The Illusion of Due Process in Commitment Proceed-
ings, 57 Nw. U.L. Rmv. 383, 385 (1962), in which the author observes that in
actual practice patients are seldom informed of their rights. To the same
effect is Slovenko, The Psychiatric Patient, Liberty, and the Law, 13 KAN.
L. REV. 59, 76 (1964).
61. See text at notes 71-81 infra.
62. "Notice, to comply with due process requirements, must be given
sufficiently in advance of scheduled court proceedings so that reasonable
opportunity to prepare will be afforded." In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 33 (1967).
63. See, e.g., Kutner, The Illusion of Due Process in Commitment Pro-
ceedings, 57 Nw. U.L. REv. 383 (1962); Slovenko & Super, Commitment Pro-
cedure in Louisiana, 35 TUL. L. REV. 705 (1961); Weihofen, Commitment of
Mental Patients, 13 RocxY MT. L. REV. 99 (1941); Comment, 1969 DUKi L.J.
677. But cf. Ross, Commitment of the Mentally Ill: Problems of Law and
Policy, 57 MICH. L. REv. 945 (1959).
64. See Comment, 1969 DuKe L.J. 677, 692-93.
65. A. DEUTSCH, THE MENTALLY ILL IN AMERICA 426 (2d ed. 1949).
66. See, e.g., Project, Civil Commitment of the Mentally Ill, 14 U.C.L.A. L.
REv. 822, 858 (1967).
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Only thirteen states still authorize jury trials, and the trend
is to do away with them altogether.6
The absence of this safeguard, however, makes the hearing
assume greater importance. Because commitment is said to be
seldom contested," it is argued that requiring a hearing in every
involuntary hospitalization proceeding would be time-consuming
and usually unnecessary. One might wonder, however, if whether
the reason commitment is seldom opposed is because one sud-
denly locked in a hospital against his will is too depressed and
stunned to attempt any challenge. Yet such a person may not
be mentally ill or in need of care and should be at liberty.
A mandatory hearing would afford some measure of protection
to such persons. A pre-commitment hearing could also serve to
determine whether one who is possibly "abnormal" in some
respect would benefit from care,69 or would be better off without
hospitalization (assuming he is not dangerous to himself or
others).
A counter-argument is that mandatory hearings will dis-
courage commitment of those who need it because families and
friends will be hesitant to air such matters publicly and in the
presence of the would-be patient. However, it would not seem
that a commitment hearing would necessarily have to be public.
Juvenile proceedings, for example, are often closed to the public.
The important thing is that the person sought to be committed
have a chance to present his defense before an impartial arbiter.70
In this regard, provision could be made to hold the hearing in
the judge's chambers, with the option of convening at any place
convenient and necessary to protect the would-be patient's men-
tal health. A request for a non-public hearing, possibly at the
patient's home, should be allowed if the judge is presented suf-
ficient evidence that such is necessary. The written statement
of two or more physicians could perhaps be a requisite for such
a request. That the patient be given the maximum feasible pro-
tection is of the greatest importance. Where apparently con-
flicting considerations-medical versus constitutional-are in-
67. LiNDMAN & MCINTYRE 28 (1961).
68. Slovenko & Super, Commitment Procedure in Loutsiana, 35 TUL. I
REv. 705, 714 (1961).
69. Cohen, The Function of the Attorney and the Commitment of the
Mentally Il, 44 TEXAs L. REv. 424, 455 (1966).
70. "When the Constitution requires a hearing, It requires a fair one,
one before a tribunal which meets at least currently prevailing standards
of impartiality." Wong Yang Sung v. McGraft, 339 U.S. 33, 50 (1950).
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volved, the decision becomes difficult. It is submitted that the
patient should have all possible legal safeguards and that these
should yield, and then but temporarily, only in cases of obvious
medical necessity.
The Right to Counsel
Louisiana makes no explicit provision for the appointment of
counsel in commitment proceedings. R.S. 28:171 provides, how-
ever, that every patient has the right to communicate in private
with counsel."' It is also provided that the parish of domicile
shall pay the costs of attorney's fees if the patient is not able
to do so. 72 Thus, it appears that an indigent patient has the right
to have his attorney's fees paid by the parish; he must first,
however, secure counsel. It is doubtful whether these statutory
provisions meet current federal constitutional standards. It can-
not be overemphasized that commitment to a mental hospital is
in many senses a very real deprivation of liberty. Where such
could result from criminal prosecutions, the United States Su-
preme Court has required that the defendant be given the bene-
fit of counsel, unless knowingly and intelligently waived.78 The
Court has also announced, in In re Gault,74 that they are not im-
pressed by labels,75 and that where a loss of liberty may result
from a juvenile proceeding, counsel must be furnished-whether
the proceeding be denominated civil or criminal.76 The Court's
decision would seem to apply equally to involuntary hospitaliza-
tion proceedings. Such reasoning has been accepted by the United
States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit. In Heryford v.
Parker,77 they held that counsel must be provided to the would-be
patient at involuntary commitment proceedings, "unless effec-
tively waived by one authorized to act in his behalf."7 As yet,
no other courts have followed or refused to follow the decision.
Counsel at commitment proceedings could perform several
functions. An attorney could question the examining doctors and
attempt to elicit answers in terms comprehensible to one not
71. LA. R.S. 28:171(1) (1950).
72. Id. 28:141.
73. See, e.g., Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966); Gideon v. Wain-
wright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
74. 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
75. Cf. also Specht v. Patterson, 386 U.S. 605 (1967); Kent v. United
States, 383 U.S. 541 (1966); Baxstrom v. Herold, 383 U.S. 107 (1966).
76. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 41 (1967).
77. 396 F.2d 393 (10th Cir. 1968).
78. Id. at 396.
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medically trained. 9 He could also question those seeking the
commitment to assure that the would-be patient's interests,
and not malice, are the stimuli for the proceedings. What type
of treatment and the practical value of any treatment might also
be explored to a limited extent.8 0 In addition, counsel could help
to protect any financial interests of the patient which might
suffer as a result of commitment.8 ' Especially beneficial might
be the psychological aid which a lawyer would supply; the per-
son whose commitment is sought would have someone he could
feel is on his side, and might be given renewed vigor to contest
a possibly unjustified commitment attempt.
Conclusion
It is submitted that Louisiana's commitment procedures are
in large part constitutionally deficient. Provision should be made
for prior notice and hearing and for the appointment of counsel
where the individual is unable to obtain his own. Where the
person is thought dangerous-a finding not to be made lightly
or routinely-the constitution may allow emergency confine-
ment if steps are instituted to safeguard the patient's rights. In
this regard, notification of the emergency confinement should
be made to counsel appointed to represent the patient at a hear-
ing to follow very soon afterwards. The state might also con-
sider establishing a Mental Health Review Service8 2 which would
79. Ross, Commitment of the Mentally Il: Problems of Law and Policy,
57 MICH. L. REV. 945, 963 (1959).
80. Note, 40 TEMP. L.Q. 381, 387-89 (1967). See generafly, Cohen, The
Function of the Attorney and the Commitment of the Mentally Ii, 44 TsxAs
L. REv. 424, 455 (1966).
81. In interdiction proceedings, by which one is relieved of control over
his property, an attorney must be appointed by the court to respresent the
would-be interdict. LA. CIV. CODE art. 391. One may suffer financial losses as
the result of commitment without Interdiction, however, and an attorney
would serve a useful function here. In any event, it is interesting to observe
the curious policy of our law which apparently gives greater protection to
one's property than to his freedom.
82. Such an agency was proposed for New York, in part as a substitute
for pre-commitment notice and hearing. See SPECIAL COMMIT'rE OF THE Asso-
CIATION OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK, MENTAL ILLNESS AND DuB
PROcESS 20 (1962). Although it is the position of this writer that pre-
commitment notice and hearing are required, except in emergency cases, a
review service which would function as the patient's advocate still appears
highly desirable. There is always a need during the patient's entire stay for
objective and periodic examination of a patient's status and right to release.
Id. at 19.
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be independent of the department of hospitals and would serve
as an "ombudsman" for patients. Establishment of such a body
would be a substantial step in the direction of insuring that
continued confinement is necessary and that the original aims
stated at its commencement are being fulfilled.
Larry C. Becnei
